Prioritisation of client reporting and focus needs to be based on the connection and likelihood of compromise, not based on the clients’ relative tiered status. Clients with higher status would likely have better defense. The ones with lower tiered connections may have greater vulnerability.
Looking at the distinctions between Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) and cyber risk – both with similar elements with supportive properties, but often misunderstood. Offering definition to aid practitioners, auditors, regulators and boards.
Organisations entering or exiting a market/ region have a number of constraints and obstacles to navigate. Often overlooked are ones related to cyber – both from legal and dependency perspectives. Here is what to consider.
Garnering policy adoption from private sector is lacking and continues to lack, to the frustration of public sector proponents. This post tackles the overlooked considerations and challenges.
Businesses that are not cyber vendors have an opportunity to sell cyber as part of their offering, taking advantage of money and effort already spent, and an opportunity to show greater understanding of their clients’ businesses in the digital space.
Every major crisis faced today is like an oncoming avalanche – but started as a pebble-sized risk overlooked. How pebble risks grow exponentially over time and how to effectively assess/preempt/mitigate are keys for effective operational resilience.
Boards need to know how to prepare organisations for dealing with cyber crime by asking questions in “peace-time” which may help during a cyber incident – aka “war-time”.
Challenges to the blending of Cyber/Fraud/AML spaces in financial services gives cybercrime more room to maneuver. Criminals find monetisation advantages in victim organisational separations, with innovative solutions based on careful observation and rapid growth in operational maturity. This post uncovers difficulties financial services encounter in cybercrime-monetisation.
Cyber criminals’ business models are evolving, often drawing on practices borrowed from the very businesses they attack. This should give hope to the victims of cyber crime because a more structured and formalised cyber crime marketplace is easier to scrutinise, realign, regulate, and possibly decimate, especially if state actors get involved in countering strategies.
In implementing Zero Trust there are challenges with an inward facing cyber strategy that doesn’t include external connections.
Maelstrom Advantage 